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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Toby Glenn Weatherly appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
after a jury found him guilty of grand theft and possession of a financial 
transaction card. Weatherly claims, for the first time on appeal, that his right to 
be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted of both grand 
theft and criminal possession of a financial transaction card. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Weatherly with one count of grand theft and one count 
of criminal possession of a financial transaction card, with a sentencing 
enhancement alleging Weatherly was a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.54-
57, 81-83.) A jury found Weatherly guilty of both counts as well as finding he 
had previously been convicted of two felonies. (R., pp.125, 165; JT Tr., p.198, 
Ls.15-24, p.207, L.23 - p.208, L.7.) The court retained jurisdiction for up to 365 
days with underlying concurrent unified 5-year sentences with one-year fixed on 
each count. (R., pp.164-167; 11/25/14 Tr., p.28, Ls.3-20.) Weatherly filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.171-17 4, 179-183.) 
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ISSUE 
Weatherly states the issue on appeal as: 
Was Mr. Weatherly twice placed in jeopardy for the same 
offense when he was convicted of and sentenced for both the 
greater offense of grand theft of a financial transaction card and the 
lesser-included offense of possession of a financial transaction 
card? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Weatherly failed to demonstrate fundamental error based on his claim 
that he could not be convicted and sentenced for both grand theft and criminal 
possession of a financial transaction card? 
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ARGUMENT 
Weatherly Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error Based On His Double 
Jeopardy Claim 
A. Introduction 
Weatherly contends, for the first time on appeal, that "his rights under the 
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Idaho Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution were violated" when a jury found him guilty of both 
grand theft and criminal possession of a financial transaction card. (Appellant's 
brief, p.5.) Weatherly however, failed to raise this claim below, and has failed to 
show that it constitutes fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a 
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error 
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. 
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). The 
interpretation and application of a statute is also a question of law subject to de 
novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. App. 
2011 ). 
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C. Weatherly Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In Relation To His 
Double Jeopardy Claim 
"There are two theories under which a particular offense may be 
determined to be a lesser included of a charged offense." State v. Sanchez-
Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 648, 339 P.3d 372, 373 (2012) (quoting State v. Curtis, 
130 Idaho 522, 524, 944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997)). Those theories are referred to 
as the statutory theory and the pleading theory. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 
648, 339 P.3d at 373 (citations omitted). Idaho appellate courts apply the 
Blockburger1 test in analyzing whether an offense is an included offense under 
the statutory theory. !st (citing State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 261 P.3d 
519, 521 (2011)). Under this test, an offense is considered included in another 
offense "if all the elements required to sustain a conviction of the lesser included 
offense are included within the elements needed to sustain a conviction of the 
greater offense." Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527, 261 P.3d at 521 (quoting State v. 
McCormick, 100 Idaho 111,114,594 P.2d 149,152 (1979)). 
Weatherly concedes on appeal that he did not preserve below his 
argument that double jeopardy, under either the United States or Idaho 
Constitutions, precluded his convictions for both grand theft and possession of a 
financial transaction card. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Despite his failure to preserve 
the issue, Weatherly argues that his claims constitute fundamental error. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) Weatherly is incorrect. 
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Weatherly to 
demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived 
1 Named after Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
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constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
In State v. Corbus, the Idaho Court of Appeals conducted its first post-
Perry fundamental error analysis of unpreserved double jeopardy claims made 
under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 
256 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2011). The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Corbus' 
conviction. kl The Court first concluded that under the Blockburger statutory 
theory, utilized by the Supreme Court of the United States in analyzing double 
jeopardy claims made under the United States Constitution, reckless driving was 
not a lesser included offense of felony eluding. Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372-74, 
256 P.3d at 780-82. Corbus had therefore failed, the Court concluded, to 
demonstrate that his United States Constitutional double jeopardy rights were 
violated (first prong of Perry). 
Second, while recognizing that reckless driving and felony eluding were 
the same offense for double jeopardy purposes pursuant to the alternative 
"pleading theory" utilized in some jurisdictions, the Court held that because it was 
unclear which theory actually applied under the Idaho Constitution, Corbus could 
not show "plain error" by relying solely on the pleading theory (second prong of 
Perry). Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372-7 4, 256 P.3d at 780-82 (recognizing that the 
second prong of the Perry test, which requires that the error "plainly exists," 
necessitates that the appellant show that existing authorities have unequivocally 
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resolved the issue in the appellant's favor). The analysis in the present case is 
nearly identical, and Weatherly has thus failed to show fundamental error on 
either his federal or state double jeopardy claim. 
1. United States Double Jeopardy Constitutional Claim 
In Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985), the United States 
Supreme Court reiterated that the Blockburger, or "statutory" test, is the proper 
method of determining whether the legislature intended the commission of two 
crimes to be separately punishable under the United States Constitution: 
This Court has consistently relied on the test of statutory 
construction stated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 
304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), to determine whether 
Congress intended the same conduct to be punishable under two 
criminal provisions. The appropriate inquiry under Blockburger is 
"whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other 
does not." ... The assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is 
that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense 
under two different statutes. 
See also Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372-74, 256 P.3d at 780-82 (recognizing that the 
Blockburger rule applied to Corbus' United States Constitution double jeopardy 
claim). 
Contrary to Weatherly's argument on appeal, possession of a financial 
transaction card is not a lesser included offense of grand theft under the 
Blockburger statutory theory, and Weatherly has thus failed to meet the first 
prong of the Perry analysis, that "one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional 
rights were violated." 
The elements of criminal possession of a financial transaction card, as 
charged in the present case, are: (1) the acquisition of a financial transaction 
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card without the consent of the cardholder; and (2) the intent to use the financial 
transaction card to defraud. See I.C. § 18-3125(1); ICJI 822. The elements of 
grand theft as charged in this case are: (1) the taking or exercise of control over 
or the transfer of a property interest in a financial transaction card; (2) the owner 
did not authorize the defendant's action; and (3) the defendant had the intent to 
deprive the owner of property. See I.C. §§ 18-2403(3), 18-2407(b)(3); ICJI 551. 
Specifically, Weatherly was charged with grand theft by using the financial 
transaction card belonging to his brother and sister-in-law to make an 
unauthorized transfer. (R., pp.56-57.) 
The crime of criminal possession of a financial transaction card (l.C. § 18-
3125(1 )), requires the intent to defraud, while the crime grand theft (I.C. §§ 18-
2403(3), 18-2407(b)(3)), does not - the latter crime may be committed by a 
person who, for example, obtains a financial transaction card with the intent to 
deprive the owner of the card but does not have the intent to use the financial 
transaction card to defraud. Grand theft as Weatherly was charged here (I.C. §§ 
18-2403(3), 18-2407(b)(3)), requires the transfer of a property interest in the 
financial transaction card (or, as here, the ultimate use of the card to obtain funds 
from an ATM), while the crime of criminal possession of a financial transaction 
card (l.C. § 18-3125(1)), does not - the latter crime may be committed even if 
there is no actual use of the financial transaction card. Thus, criminal possession 
of a financial transaction card is not a lesser included offense of grand theft 
under the statutory, or Blockburger test. 
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At best, had Weatherly raised this issue below, he could have made a 
plausible argument that one cannot steal a financial transaction card without 
possessing it, and that criminal possession of a financial transaction card is thus 
a lesser included offense of grand theft. However, even if he had made such an 
argument, Weatherly could not show fundamental error under the second prong 
of the Perry analysis. The state has found no case where an Idaho appellate 
court has specifically considered the issue of whether grand theft of a financial 
transaction card necessarily constitutes criminal possession of a financial 
transaction card. With no Idaho caselaw on point, Weatherly cannot show "plain 
error," i.e. that "existing authorities have unequivocally resolved the issue in the 
appellant's favor," under the second prong of the Perry analysis. See Corbus, 
151 Idaho at 372-375, 256 P.3d at 780-84. 
Criminal possession of a financial transaction card is not a lesser included 
offense of grand theft under the Blockburger test because each crime requires an 
element that the other does not. Even if Weatherly could have presented some 
argument that the two crimes at issue were in fact "the same crime" pursuant to a 
Blockburger analysis, he cannot show "plain error" in light of the lack of 
precedent. Weatherly has thus failed to show fundamental error under the 
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. 
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2. Idaho Double Jeopardy Constitutional Claim 
Weatherly also argues for the first time on appeal a violation of his double 
jeopardy rights under a "pleadings" analysis. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) In 
support of this argument, Weatherly argues he "was charged by information with 
one count of grand theft and one count of possession of a financial transaction 
card, both arising from his possession and one time use of a single prepaid cash 
card. (Appellant's brief, p.11 (citation to the record omitted).) 
Idaho is among several jurisdictions which have, at least occasionally, 
utilized the "pleading theory" to determine whether the conviction and 
punishment for two offenses violates the double jeopardy clause of respective 
state constitutions. See Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372-375, 256 P.3d at 780-84. 
Under the "pleading theory," a court must consider whether the terms of the 
charging document allege that both offenses arose from the same factual 
circumstance such that one offense was the means by which the other was 
committed. ls!. Because the pleading theory relies on an examination of the 
charging Information, it generally provides a broader definition of greater and 
lesser included offenses than a statutory theory approach. ls!. 
However, as the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized in Corbus, while the 
Idaho Supreme Court has utilized the pleading theory in the past, it has not done 
so consistently. In fact, contrary to Weatherly's conclusory assertion on appeal 
that "Idaho has adopted the broader 'pleading theory"' with regard to double 
jeopardy analysis (Appellant's brief, p.11 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
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recognized that the Idaho Constitution's double jeopardy jurisprudence is 
anything but clear: 
Our review of the Idaho Supreme Court cases including 
[State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 234 P.3d 707 (2010); State v. 
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991); Sivak v. State, 112 
Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1986); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 
430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980)] demonstrates the available authority 
does not provide a clear answer to the question of which analytical 
theory should be applied in double jeopardy cases which allege a 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution. 
It is not clear from existing precedent whether the Blockburger test, 
the pleading theory used in Thompson, or the pleading theory used 
in Stewart, Pizzuto, and Sivak should properly be applied in this 
case. In addition, application of each of these theories would result 
in contradictory conclusions. Therefore, Corbus has failed, under 
the second prong of the Perry test, to show fundamental error with 
regard to his double jeopardy claim which arises under the Idaho 
Constitution. Consequently, we will not further consider this 
argument on appeal. 
Corbus, 151 Idaho at 375, 256 P.3d at 784. 
Similarly, Weatherly's Idaho Constitutional double jeopardy claim fails the 
second prong of a Perry analysis. Weatherly cannot, as he attempts to do, rely 
on the more forgiving "pleading theory" and show "plain error" under the second 
prong of Perry, because it is not at all clear whether the "pleading theory" even 
applies under the Idaho Constitution. Corbus, 151 Idaho at 373, 256 P.3d at 
781 (The Perry requirement that the error plainly exists necessitates that the 
appellant show that existing authorities have unequivocally resolved the issue in 
the appellant's favor.). A defendant who maintains that the "pleading theory" is 
indeed the law in Idaho must first raise the issue to the district court. 
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Weatherly has failed to show fundamental error with regard to either his 
United States or Idaho Constitutional double jeopardy claims. As such, this 
Court should thus affirm his convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Weatherly's convictions 
and sentences for both grand theft and criminal possession of a financial 
transaction card. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of November, 2015, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Pu 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. [ WI 
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